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Abstract 
In this paper, the method of modeling attack using attack tree is researched. The main goal is effectively using attack 
tree to model and express multi-stage network attacks. We expand and improve the traditional attack tree. The attack 
nodes in traditional attack tree are redefined, and the attack risk of leaf node is quantified. On those basis, the 
mentality and method of building MLL-AT (Multi-Level & Layer Attack Tree) are proposed. The improved attack 
tree can model attack more accurately, in particular to multi-stage network attacks. And the new model can also be 
used to evaluate system’s risk, to distinguish between varying system security threat degrees caused by different 
attack sequences. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction 
Modeling network attack behavior, especially multi-stage network attack behavior now becomes one 
of  the difficult study point. The primary means of modeling network behaviors include: attack 
description language[1~3] , attack tree[10], attack graph[4~6] and attack net[7~9]. Among them, attack tree 
method is relatively simple while modeling and describing attack. However, the traditional attack tree 
exists the following deficiencies while modeling and describing multi-stage network attack: (1)It does not 
distinguish attack behavior and results, and therefore lead to confusion; (2)Only concerned about the 
detection of single attack, the correlation between attacks can not be inadequately described; (3)The 
system state and state’s change can not be described adequately due to less information was covered by 
attack nodes; (4) The attack tree will become very large while attack is complex. For these shortcomings, 
we expand and improve the attack modeling idea of traditional attack tree. The definition of attack node 
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is expanded and the attack risk of leaf node is qualified, besides, evaluation parameters are added. An 
new method to building attack modeling using MLL-AT is proposed.  
2. Traditional Attack Tree 
Attack tree model was put forward by Bruce Schneier in 1999[10]. The interdependent relationship 
between attack behavior and steps are denoted in tree model. Each attack tree enumerates and specifies 
the attack method used by attacker in detail. Each path in attack tree represents only once attack process. 
Each network or information system has an attack tree set, known as attack forest. In traditional attack 
tree, Root node represents the ultimate attack target. Leaf node represents a possible attack mean. 
Intermediate nodes represent the intermediate steps or conceptual attack targets, also known as sub-
targets. Each sub-tree of root node represents the optional path. AND/OR/SAND nodes are contained in 
attack tree. To reach AND node, the various branches under which must be completed. To reach OR 
node, as long as any branches under it be completed. To reach SAND node, the branches under which 
must all be completed in chronological order. The graphical representation of these nodes is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Diagram between attack tree nodes 
3. The MLL-AT attack modeling method 
In order to better model and describe complex intrusion process, the Level & Layer attack tree is 
proposed in this paper. We expand the parameters of attack tree, in order to create the model which can 
describe and capture multi-stage network attacks.  
3.1 Definition of MLL-AT 
We redefine attack nodes. Abstract nodes and concrete nodes are distinguished according to different 
abstraction degree. Nodes are described on different levels. Abstract node can represent the intermediate 
attack state or the ultimate attack target. Concrete node only describing a single attack event or attack 
behavior. Different layer attack trees can be established. The abstract nodes are allowed to fold up in 
MLL-AT to form a higher layer attack tree. The most top layer tree is called top-layer tree. In this way, 
the complex attack tree can become simple and clear. Meanwhile, its denoting and storing is more 
conducive.  
3.2 Definition of attack node 
Abstract and concrete nodes are expressed as unified form. And they are distinguished only on 
specific definition details. The following nine-tuple is used to define attack node: <Node name, level, 
type, son node, association relationship with its father nodes, attack descriptions, attribute set, the context, 
weights>. 
(1)Node name 
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Node name is used to identify the name of node. Generall, it is expressed as string.  
(2) Level
Level is used to identify the status of attack nodes. Three levels exist: incident level, state level and 
target level. The corresponding nodes are called event-level nodes, state-level nodes and target-level 
nodes. The former belongs to concrete node, and the latter two belong to abstract node. The event-level 
node(namely leaf node in traditional attack tree) associates with specific intrusion behavior. The state-
level node represents the abstract attack status and steps. The target-level node represents attack target 
deduced by event-level and state-level nodes. For multi-stage complex attack, this target may be starting 
of next phase attack. The target-level node and state-level node are relatively stable. But the event-level 
node needs to be updated dynamically with the discovery of new attack methods. 
(3) Type 
Node type determines the relationship between the node and its son nodes(if exist). Node type include 
four categories: LEAF node(single node), AND node, SAND node and OR node. 
(4) Son node 
It refers to the son of node. Three relationship may exists between them: AND, SAND and OR.  
(5) Association relationship with its father nodes 
It’s used to describe the association relationship between the node and its parent node. Two types 
included: inherent association and external association. To target node, this value is empty.  
(6) Attack descriptions 
Single predicate is used to describ attack. To event-level node, the attack behavior-related predicate is 
used. To state-level node, the host system-related or behavior-related predicates are used. To target-level 
node, the host-system-related predicate is used to describe ultimate attack target. 
(7) Attribute set 
It refers to the set of attributes associated with nodes, such as timestamp, source or destination host 
name, source or destination IP address, source or destination port, network address, attack code, services, 
vulnerability, etc. 
(8) The context 
To multi-stage network attack, the attack state of each stage should be limited in particular context, in 
order to reduce the misjudge. P(A) and C(A) are used to represent the premise and result of attack node. 
The premise refers to the conditions that should be satisfied. P(A) and C(A) can be atomic predicate or 
predicate formula, with parameter variables come from the attribute set. When the premise and result are 
complex, ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬(not) symbolics are used to form predicate formula. Owing to the 
characteristics of tree, when the attack corresponding to attack node took place, not only P (A) must be 
met, but also its child nodes should have been completed and meet specific requirements. These predicate 
can be divided into the following categories: 
1) Time-related predicate: It’s used to describe the time relationship between attack nodes. For 
example, isBefore(ANode1, ANode2). 
2) The host-system-related predicates: It’s used to describe the properties and states of host. For 
example, ExistHost (dIP) indicates that the host identified by IP address “dIP” have existed.  
3) System-services-related predicate: It’s used to describe the system’s services and characteristics 
related to services, such as ServiceVersion(Service, Version). 
4) Behavior-related predicate: It’s used to describe the attack behavior of attacker, or the ability status 
of attacker. For example, Execute(program) indicates that the attacker execute a specific attack program.  
(9) Weights 
The weights are only assigned to leaf node to measure the possibility of attack. The 2- tuple (diff, 
detect) is used to quantify attack risk of leaf nodes. “diff” is used to indicate the difficulty of attack, and 
“detect” is used to indicate the attack detection possibility. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to 
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calculate the weights of all leaf nodes, which can be deduced by its sub-tree step by step according to the 
leaf nodes’s weights.
3.3 The relationship between attack nodes 
(1) Functional relationship 
Functional relationship refer to the causal relationship between child nodes and its parent. To leaf 
node, no child nodes exist. Otherwise, to reach this node, its child nodes must be achieved firstly. So 
direct causal relationship exists between parent node and its son, and indirect causal relationship exists 
between parenet and all the descendants of its son nodes. Parent node is the result node of its child, and 
each child node is the antecedent of their parent. 
(2) Association relationship 
According to the importance of child node relative to its parent node, the association relationship is 
divided into two types: inherent association and external association, which are expressed respectively as 
solid line and dashed line in attack tree. Inherent association indicates that implementation a node will 
trigger the parent node. External association indicates that successfully reaching a node, the conditions to 
carry the next step attack are satisfied, but the next step attack may not always actually carried. 
3.4 Weight of root node 
The risk of whole tree is calculated and deduced from the risk of leaf nodes. “diff” and “detect” 
property are assigned to leaf node. In order to get more objective evaluation result, the multi-attribute 
utility theory is used to calculate and evaluate system’s risk. Converting these two properties into the 
utility values of achieving attack target, that is, the attack occurrence possibility of leaf node. The detailed 
method are given as follows. 
(1) The occurrence probability of leaf node s 
 Ps=Wdiff*U(diffs)+Wdete*U(detects)
Where, s is on behalf of any leaf node. Ps represents the attack occurrence probability of s. Parameter 
diffs indicates the attack difficulty to achieve leaf node. Parameter detects indicates the detection 
possibility of s. Let Wdiff be the weight of  diffs, Wdetect be the weight of detects. U (diffs) is the utility of 
parameter diffs, and U(detects) is the utility of parameter detects [11].
In risk management field, Risk(R)=the occurrence possibility of a potential threat (P) ×the impact on 
system caused by threat incident(C). In terms of leaf node, since the attacker has not yet reached the 
ultimate target, we can temporarily consider that it have not yet impacted system. Take C=1. That is, Rs = 
Ps (Rs is the risk of leaf node). 
(2) Calculation the probability of the other nodes 
To AND node q, its occurrence probability equals to the product of occurrence probability of its each 
sub-trees. That is, )()()()( 21 nqPqPqPqP ×××= … . To SAND node q, conditional probability can be 
used . That is, )|()|()|()()( 121213121 −×××= nn qqqqPqqqPqqPqPqP �� . To OR node q, its occurrence 
probability equals to the maximu occurrence probability of its all sub-tree. That is, 
)}(,),(),(max{)( 21 nqPqPqPqP �= . Where, q1,q2,…qn is the root of each sub-tree of q. 
(3) Calculation method of attack tree’s total risk  
The total risk of attack tree is calculated by Risk(A). The calculation process is as follows [12].
① Function：Risk(A)
② Input：Parameters A (A is the root of attack tree) 
③ Output：total risk of attack tree (the risk of root) 
Begin
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if A is AND-Node then
return Multiply(Risk(Ai)|∀ Ai∈childnodes(A))  
else if A is SAND-Node then 
return Condition_Probability(Risk(Ai)|∀ Ai∈childnodes(A))
else if A is OR-Node then 
return Max(Risk(Ai)|∀ Ai∈childnodes(A)) 
else if A is LEAF-Node then  
 return P(A) 
end if 
End
Where, Ai is the arbitrary son of node A. Multiply(Risk(Ai)) is the product of occurrence probability 
of each sub-tree of node A. Condition_Probability(Risk(Ai)) is the occurrence probability of A 
represented by conditional probability. Function Max(Risk(Ai)) shows that the occurrence probability of 
A equals to the maximu occurrence probability of its all sub-trees. 
3.5 Construction attack sequence 
Attack sequence is composed of a series of atomic attack(correspond to leaf node). After realizing this 
group of leaf nodes, we can finally achieve to attacker’s target. In terms of each alternative attack 
sequence, the attack occurrence possibility can be estimated according the texts above. The larger the 
value, the more we should focus on defensing. After expanding the top layer tree in MLL-AT, call 
function Attack-sequence(A,n,S) with recursive algorithm to construct attack sequence.  
(1) Function：Attack-sequence(A, n, S) 
(2) Input：Parameter A represents the root node. Parameter n represents child number of root node. 
And parameter S represents the attack sequence that we get 
(3) Output：Take parameter S as a return value, it returns a possible attack sequence 
Begin
for i=1 to n 
begin
if ChildAi is LEAF then    
// ChildAi  refers to the No.i child of A 
   {  Si=(ChildAi);
      Return;  } 
else
   Attack-sequence(ChildAi, Ki, Si);
//Ki represent child number of ChildAi
end





//Merge all contents in set Si (i=1 ~n) into S 




//take out any one in set Si (i=1 ~n) into S 
End 
4. Case Study 
Use the following intrusion process to illustrate MLL-AT. As shown in Figure 2. Two hosts with 
vulnerabilities are contained in a simple intranet with operating system and services are listed as follows. 
(1) mysql.edu.cn (192.168.1.68) 
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OS: Sun Solaris 7.0 X86 
Services: MySQL 3.23.9 in.telnetd  
(2) bind.edu.cn (192.168.1.52) 
OS: Redhat Linux 6.1 I386 
Services: BIND(named) version 8.2 
Figure 2. The topology diagram of network environment
The intrusion process can be divided into three stages. 
(1) Get the root privilege of host “bind” 
Attacker scan the target network to find that “bind” is a computer with Linux operating system and 
running “name” daemon program with version 8.2. A remote buffer overflow vulnerability “Bind 
nxt”(BID 788，CVE-1999-0833) exists on daemon. Attacker remotely exploit this vulnerability, and 
obtain the root privilege of host “bind”. 
(2) Get normal user account of host “mysql” 
Attacker use the privilege to log into host “bind”, and install sniffer tools on it. When a local 
workstation telnets to host “mysql”, attacker intercept its user name and password. Thus, an normal user 
account of “mysql” is got. 
(3) Get root privilege of host “mysql” 
Attacker spy host “mysql” to find that a local buffer overflow vulnerability MYSQL SELECT 
(BID2262，CVE-MAP-NOMATCH ) exists in “mysql” applications. He log into host “mysql” and 
exploit this vulnerability to get the root privilege of host “mysql”. 
Throughout the process above, the local buffer overflow vulnerability(MySQL SELECT Vulnerability) 
in host “mysql” and a remote buffer overflow vulnerability(Bind nxt Vulnerability) in host “bind” were 
used. The tree model established by MLL-AT is shown in Figure 3. 
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 Figure 3. Diagram of MLL-AT model for the instance 
5. Conclusion 
The MLL-AT network attack modeling method is proposed. This method is innovative, reasonable 
and effective, which resolves the deficiences in traditional attack tree. Its contributions can be 
summarized as: (1)The attack nodes are characterized, context is introduced, and the description methods 
of association relationship and context are put forward.(2)Attack nodes are hierarchically described,  
attack risk of leaf nodes is quantified, method of calculating attack node occurrence possibility is given. 
(3) Parameterized attack tree provides a flexible framework to describing the multi-stage network attacks. 
(4) The multi-layer attack tree facilitate us to eliminating the out of date nodes at top layer, updateing 
invasion scenarios, and refining attack mode, etc. All these work lay the foundation for studying attack 
and developing security policies in depth. 
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